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Essay:
The Ohio Motto Survives the Establishment Clause
THE HONORABLE RICHARD F. SUHRHEINRJCH*
T. MELINDAH BUSH**
Federal courts have grown increasingly confused and divided by the Supreme
Court's contradictory and bewildering body ofprecedent involving the application
of the Establishment Clause to those government references to religion often
designated as "civic piety" or "ceremonial deism." This confusion has permitted
groups adverse to religion in general to drive out any mention or use of God by
government, even generic references that are part of this country's history and
tradition. One example of this effort to stamp out generic references to religion by
government, and the confusion and division such an effort has created in the federal
courts, is the Ohio Motto case, in which the plaintiffs sought to strike down the Ohio
state motto, "With God All Things Are Possible," as an unconstitutional
endorsement of Christianity. The authors propose that, when properly applied, the
endorsement test reconciles the country's Constitutional commitment to religious
tolerance and pluralism with the nation's religious heritage and its government's
generic references to religion, like the Ohio state motto.
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11,2001, a great tragedy occurred and Americans throughout the
land immediately turned to their God for help and consolation. Not since World War
II has this country sang "God Bless America" with such fervor and frequency. Indeed,
on September 11, when the U.S. Congress was evacuated, members gathered on the
steps of the Capitol and sang "God Bless America."' The Presidential Proclamation,
declaring a National Day of Prayer and Remembrance for the Victims of the Terrorist
Attacks on September 11, 2001, explicitly referred to the New Testament: "Blessed
are those who mourn for they shall be comforted."2 The memorial service hosted by
the City of New York in Yankee Stadium featured Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Sikh,
Hindu, and Buddhist religious leaders, among others. Similarly, during the memorial
* Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
** Associate with Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, D.C. and former law clerk to Honorable
Richard F. Suhrheinrich, 1999-2000. My thanks to my loving husband, Nathan Bush, whose
support and thoughtful input have been invaluable in this and all my endeavors.
I Tellingly, these members of Congress selected "God Bless America" over the National
Anthem, which does not prominently refer to God. The national anthem does, however, include the
phrase "In God is our trust" in a later, lesser-known verse.
2 Proclamation No. 7462, 66 Fed. Reg. 47,947 (Sept. 14, 2001) ("They have prayed for
comfort in a time of grief .... ), available at http://www.nationaldayofprayer.org/media/
president.cfm (Nov. 27,2001). The biblical quotation, like Ohio's motto, can be found in the Book
of Matthew at 5:4.
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at the National Cathedral in Washington, D.C., religious leaders from diverse faiths
offered prayers before an audience of the country's political leaders. As these and
other recent events demonstrate, Americans frequently invoke their Creator's help in
times of national crisis.
Yet this religious tradition, which dates back to the Revolutionary War and the
beginning of our country, has been increasingly under attack. Recently, government
invocations of religion borne from this traditional recognition of religion by
government have been struck down, surprisingly, as an unconstitutional endorsement
of Christianity. One such challenged phrase was the Ohio state motto, which reads,
"With God All Things Are Possible."3
Although seemingly no different from other permitted invocations of religion by
government, such as the national motto "In God We Trust,"4 Ohio's state motto was
attacked as an attempt by the Ohio Legislature to "establish" religion by endorsing
Christianity. Although the Sixth Circuit ultimately concluded that the saying is not an
impermissible establishment of religion, the case divided the en banc court and
engendered numerous disagreements as to the proper test of what constitutes an
endorsement of religion. The nature of this debate stems from Supreme Court
decisions in this area, which have created a contradictory and bewildering body of
precedent that is easily manipulated. In the authors' view, this confusing body of case
law has allowed groups adverse to religion to drive out any mention or use of God,
even a generic one. ACLU v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board,5 (hereinafter
the "Ohio motto case"), with its numerous separate decisions, is a perfect illustration
of the confusion caused by the Supreme Court's inconsistent view of the
Establishment Clause and the need to reconcile these tests into a more cohesive
analysis. 6
This essay will examine the various opinions issued in the Ohio motto case, as set
against the framework of the foregoing Supreme Court precedent. Finally, we will
propose that, when properly applied, the endorsement test integrates our national
heritage as a religious nation with our Constitutional commitment to religious
tolerance and pluralism, which is often referred to as "civic piety" or "ceremonial
deism."7
3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5.06 (Anderson 2001).
4 See 36 U.S.C. § 302 (2000); 31 U.S.C. § 5114 (2000) (placing "In God We Trust" on
coins).
5 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
6 The Establishment Clause provides "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the First
Amendment is fully applicable to the States. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992).
7 The Supreme Court recognized the concept and permissibility of "ceremonial deism" in
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). "Ceremonial deism" is a term coined by Yale Law
School Professor Eugene Rostow to describe this country's deeply entrenched tradition of civic
piety. See Arthur E. Sutherland, Book Review, 40 IND. L.J. 83, 86 (1964) (reviewing WILBER G.
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I. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TESTS
Before addressing the confusion evident in the Ohio motto case, it is important to
review the various tests the Supreme Court has created to evaluate challenges to the
Establishment Clause. Over the last three decades, the Supreme Court has used
several tests to analyze alleged violations of the Establishment Clause: the three-prong
test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman8; the "coercion" test, first used by the Supreme
Court in Lee v. Weisman9; the endorsement test, first articulated by Justice O'Connor
in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly10 ; and the "ceremonial deism" test
recognized in Marsh v. Chambers. " I
The Lemon test has three parts: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an 'excessive government
entanglement with religion.' "12 The "coercion test" establishes that "at a minimum,
the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a
[state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.' "13 It prohibits government from
either directly or indirectly coercing anyone "to support or participate in religion or its
exercise." 14
The third and fourth tests form the basis for much of the confusion engendered in
the Ohio motto case: the concept of "ceremonial deism" and the "endorsement
test." 15 The Supreme Court recognized the concept and permissibility of "ceremonial
KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSITUnONS (1963)). Other examples of "ceremonial deism,"
including the national motto "In God We Trust," have been explicitly upheld by other courts and
implicitly approved by the Supreme Court. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,602-
03 (1989) ("Our previous opinions have considered in dicta the [national] motto and the pledge [of
allegiance], characterizing them as consistent with the proposition that government may not
communicate an endorsement of religious belief.").
8 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
9 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
10 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
12 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (internal citation omitted).
13 Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678).
14Id. at 587.
15 The Ohio motto case did not extensively employ the other two tests, so this article will not
discuss them in detail. However, in a recent decision, the Sixth Circuit explained its position on the
various tests as follows: "While we have recognized that individual Supreme Court justices have
expressed reservations regarding the Lemon test, see American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio v.
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 306 & n.15 (6th Cir. 2001) (collecting
opinions), we are an intermediate federal court and are bound to follow this test until the Supreme
Court explicitly overrules or abandons it." Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 417,479 (6th Cir. 2002). The
Court added that it treats the endorsement test as a refinement of the second Lemon prong. Id.
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deism" in Marsh v. Chambers. Examples of ceremonial deism include various deeply
entrenched traditions of civic piety, including legislative prayers, which were upheld
by the Supreme Court in Marsh. Other examples of ceremonial deism, including the
national motto "In God We Trust," have been explicitly upheld by other courts and
implicitly approved by the Supreme Court. 16
Ceremonial deism, then, considers the country's traditional invocations of
religion to determine whether the challenged government action falls within that
permitted tradition. ' 7 By contrast, under the endorsement test, government conduct is
unconstitutional if, at the very least, a "reasonable observer" would view it as
endorsing one religion over another. 18
Justice O'Connor introduced the endorsement test in a concurring opinion in
Lynch v. Donnelly19 as a new approach to the "purpose" and "effect" elements of the
Lemon 20 test. Justice O'Connor described this part of the Lemon test as asking
whether "the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval.",21 If so, that practice would be invalid.
Justice O'Connor refined this "endorsement" approach the following year in a
concurring opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, in which the endorsement test was
described as not forbidding government from acknowledging religion:2
2
The endorsement test does not preclude government from acknowledging religion or
from taking religion into account in making law and policy. It does preclude
government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a
particular religious belief is favored or preferred. Such an endorsement infringes the
religious liberty of the nonadherent, for "[w]hen the power, prestige and financial
support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially
approved religion is plain." 23
The endorsement test has since been accepted by a majority of Supreme Court
Justices and is routinely applied by lower courts. 24 Although the endorsement test is
16 See supra note 7.
17 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
18 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concumng) (introducing
the endorsement test); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,630-31 (1989) (O'Connor, J.
concurring) (establishing the "reasonable observer" standard).
'9 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687.
20 See supra note 12.
21 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (emphasis added).
22 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985).
23 Id. (internal citations omitted).
24 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989) (stating that Justice




an accepted Establishment Clause analysis, the Justices have not yet reached a
consensus over the knowledge to be attributed to that observer. Justice O'Connor and
Justice Stevens advocate competing views of the level of knowledge attributable to
that reasonable observer in Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette.25
For Justice O'Connor, the "relevant issue" in the endorsement test is "whether an
objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation
of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement." 26 By definition, Justice
O'Connor's reasonable observer is charged with more knowledge than that of the
average person, who would likely be unaware of the text and legislative history of the
government's challenged conduct.
Justice Stevens, however, would charge the reasonable observer with a lesser
degree of knowledge and experience akin to that of the average passer-by. To Justice
Stevens, the reasonable observer would simply be objectively reasonable, relying on
no additional knowledge beyond that which "meets the eye." 27 Indeed, Justice
Stevens has argued that the endorsement test is violated if any reasonable person
could perceive a message of endorsement. To Justice Stevens, this would include
tourists, travelling salesmen, and school children.28 Justice Stevens has rejected
Justice O'Connor's reasonable observer, whom he describes as a "well-schooled
jurist," and has argued that such an "ideal observer" would "strip" the constitutional
protections of "every reasonable person whose knowledge happens to fall below" that
"ideal standard."'29 This use of an" 'ultrareasonable observer'," according to Justice
Stevens, is inappropriate because that observer would understand "the vagaries of this
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence," when the Justices and courts currently do
not.3
0
25 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995).
I therefore disagree that the endorsement test should focus on the actual perception of
individual observers, who naturally have differing degrees of knowledge. Under such an
approach, a religious display is necessarily precluded so long as some passersby would
perceive a governmental endorsement thereof. In my view, however, the endorsement test
creates a more collective standard to gauge "the 'objective' meaning of the [government's]
statement in the community." In this respect, the applicable observer is similar to the
"reasonable person" in tort law, who "is not to be identified with any ordinary individual, who
might occasionally do unreasonable things," but is "rather a personification of a community
ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the [collective] social judgment."
Id. at 779-80 (internal citations omitted) (O'Connor, J., joined by Souter and Breyer, JJ.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board
in Pinette is the same Board involved in the Ohio motto case.
26 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (emphasis added).
27 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28 Id. at 799-800 & n.5, 808 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 807 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Because the endorsement test depends upon the perspective of the reasonable
observer, the knowledge attributed to that observer can affect the outcome of the
analysis. This uncertainty leaves room for courts to predetermine the outcome of the
endorsement test by manipulating the knowledge imputed to the reasonable observer
to strike down otherwise appropriate government references to religion. One recent
example of this manipulation borne of confusion is found in the Ohio motto case, in
which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was divided, in part because of a
disagreement concerning the knowledge attributed to the reasonable observer.
I1. THE OHIO MOTTO CASE
A. Facts of the Case
On October 1, 1959, three years after Congress adopted "In God We Trust" as
the national motto,31 Ohio's General Assembly adopted the phrase "With God All
Things Are Possible" as the state's official motto. 32 Although there is no official
history of this legislation, most agree the Ohio motto was first suggested by a
Cincinnati boy who was concerned that Ohio was one of only two states that then
lacked an official motto.33 With the assistance of then-Secretary of State Ted W.
Brown, the twelve-year-old made several trips to Columbus to lobby for his proposal.
A press release issued at that time by Secretary Brown indicated the motto had been
drawn from "a verse in the New Testament, Matthew 19:26." 34 After the Ohio
General Assembly adopted the motto, it was codified in a chapter of the Ohio Revised
Code captioned "State Insignia; Seals; Holidays," alongside designations of official
emblems ranging from the state flag and seal to the state bird, flower, and
"invertebrate fossil."'35
Soon thereafter, Secretary Brown approved a design incorporating the Ohio
motto on a ribbon-like banner curled beneath the state seal, which is a circular
emblem featuring a sheaf of wheat, and other non-religious images. 36 This new
design later appeared on state letterhead and other official documents, such as state
tax forms. 37
Ohio's motto went unchallenged until 1996 when then-Governor George
Voinovich recommended to the Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board
31 In 1956, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation making "In God We Trust" the nation's
official motto. See 36 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
32 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5.06 (Anderson 2001).
33 See ACLU v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1178 (S.D.
Ohio 1998) ("ACLU ").
34 Id.
35 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5.071 (Anderson 2001).
36 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5.04 (Anderson 2001).37 See ACLUL1 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1178.
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("Board") that the motto be inscribed above the main entrance to the Ohio statehouse.
The governor was reportedly inspired with the idea during a trip to India where he
saw the motto "Government Work Is God's Work" inscribed on a public building
there.38 The Board subsequently agreed to engrave the state seal and motto on a
granite plaza at the west entrance of the Ohio statehouse.
The American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio ("ACLU"), along with a
Presbyterian minister, quickly filed suit against the Board, Governor Voinovich, and
other state officials challenging the motto's constitutionality and seeking to
permanently enjoin the motto's display in any official capacity. The ACLU argued
that the motto unconstitutionally endorsed Christianity because it was a saying
attributed to Jesus in the New Testament. The plaintiffs pointed to Secretary Brown's
1959 press release and contemporary state pamphlets relating the motto's history and
biblical origins to establish that the motto was taken from the New Testament in the
gospel of Matthew, Chapter 19, verse 26.39 That chapter relates an episode in which a
wealthy young man who has observed the commandments asks Jesus what else he
must do to attain "eternal life." 40 Jesus responds by instructing the wealthy man to sell
his possessions, give what he has to the poor, and, in some translations, to "follow"
Jesus.41 When the disheartened young man retreats, Jesus explains "it is easier for a
camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of
38 Id. By statute, Ohio's Governor has the authority to approve all uses of the official state
seal of Ohio. See OHIoREV. CODE ANN. § 5.10 (Anderson 2001). Likewise, the Board is required
to regulate any and all uses of the Capitol Square and has the authority to approve all
improvements and additions to the statehouse and statehouse grounds. See OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 105.41 (Anderson 2001).
39 The relevant biblical text recounts a dialogue between Jesus and a rich young man:
Jesus said unto him, if thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the
poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come and follow me.
But then the young man heard that saying, he went away sorrowful; for he had great
possessions.
Then said Jesus unto his disciples, Verily I say unto you, That a rich man shall hardly
enter into the kingdom of heaven.
And again I say unto you, It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than
for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven.
When his disciples heard it, they were exceedingly amazed, saying, Who then can be
saved?
But Jesus beheld them, and said unto them, With men this is impossible; but with God
all things are possible.
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God."'42 When his disciples ask who, if not this wealthy and pious man, can be
"saved," Jesus assures them that "with men this is impossible, but with God all things
are possible." 43
The ACLU maintained this passage concerned the path to salvation, which it
viewed as a uniquely Christian principle. Several witnesses for both the plaintiffs and
defendants agreed that, when viewed in its biblical context, one possible
interpretation of the phrase "With God All Things Are Possible" was that with God it
is possible to attain salvation even if such salvation would otherwise be impossible.44
The plaintiffs then concluded that the Ohio motto impermissibly endorsed
Christianity because it quoted Jesus' discussion of the uniquely Christian concept of
salvation.
The State of Ohio countered that its motto, like the national motto, was merely a
generic reference to God meant to inspire hope in its citizenry without endorsing any
particular religion. As such, the state contended that its motto was an appropriate
expression of "ceremonial deism."45 The defendants also presented evidence that
similar phrases appear in several non-Christian religious and literary texts, and that
the average individual could not recognize the motto as a passage from the Bible. For
these reasons, the state argued its motto did not endorse Christianity and was
constitutional. 46
B. The District Court's Opinion ("ACLU I")
The district court found the proposed inscription of the motto on the statehouse
grounds to be constitutional because a reasonable observer would not view it as
endorsing Christianity. The district court's observer more closely resembled Justice
Stevens's reasonable observer than Justice O'Connor's. First, the district court noted
that the statute codifying the motto, like the proposed statehouse plaza display,
contained no references to Jesus or the New Testament. 47 The district court also
4 2 Id. 19:24.
4 3 Id. 19:26.
44 Two of plaintiffs' witnesses, including Ronald Stone, a professor of Christian Ethics at
Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, and plaintiff Matthew Peterson, an associate pastor of a
Presbyterian Church in Columbus, Ohio, testified that the phrase discussed the concept of
salvation. Two of the defendants' witnesses also admitted that the phrase could be interpreted as a
discussion regarding salvation, but then added that this was one of many different interpretations of
the passage. The defendants' witnesses included Thomas D. Kasulis, a professor and chair of the
Division of Comparative Studies at Ohio State University, and Dr. David Belcastro, an associate
professor of Religious Studies at Capital University. See ACLU v. Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703, 707-10 (6th Cir. 2000) ("A CLU II").
45 See supra note 7.
46 See ACLU II, 210 F.3d at 711-12.
4 7 ACLU, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1179 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
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found that the words of the motto, when "[r]emoved from their Christian New
Testament context," did not "suggest a denominational preference." 48 Rather, the
motto "could be classified as generically theistic" and was "certainly compatible with
all three of the world's major monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam."49 The district court further noted similar phrases in Hebrew scripture50 and
the Islamic holy book, the Qur'an.51 Moreover, the district court found there was "no
evidence that a reasonable person who reads the words of the motto would recognize
them as the words of Jesus or understand them as suggesting a denominational
preference." 52
Although the district court did not describe the knowledge it attributed to this
reasonable observer, its observer, like the average passerby, apparently lacked
sufficient knowledge to identify the biblical origins of the motto as it appeared to the
public. Indeed, evidence before the court revealed that even religious scholars were
unable to recognize the biblical origins of the motto. The district court noted the
testimony of a senior rabbi who admitted that while the motto struck him as "vaguely
familiar," he did not recognize its source.53 The district court also noted testimony
that an average college student would not know its source.54 Relying on this
evidence, the court found that even "an objective and reasonably informed observer
would not perceive the motto as sectarian." 55
Because the reasonable observer would not view the motto as sectarian, the
district court found it to be constitutional under the endorsement test. As such, it was
like "In God We Trust," which was derived from the Old Testament and was also
viewed as nonsectarian. 56 The district court also found the Ohio motto did not violate
the Lemon test because mottos like Ohio's are part of a long tradition of government
acknowledgments of religion. 57 This tradition dated back to the first U.S. Congress at
the time when the First Amendment was adopted, which the district court found to be
strong evidence that such religious acknowledgments were indeed constitutional.
The district court, however, qualified its approval of the motto by permanently
enjoining the state "from attributing the words of the motto to the text of the Christian
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See Genesis 18:14 ("Is anything too hard for the Lord?"); Job 42:2 ("I know that thou canst
do everything."); Jeremiah 32:17 ("Ah Lord God! Behold, thou hast made the heaven and the earth
by thy great power and out-stretched arm, and there is nothing too hard for thee.").
51 See, e.g., THE HOLY QUR-AN, Sura 2:148 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., 1978) ("Wheresoever
ye are, God will bring you Together. For God Hath power over all things.").





57 Seeid. at 1182.
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New Testament. '58 As long as the motto was presented to the public devoid of its
biblical surroundings, it was nonsectarian and did not endorse Christianity in the eyes
of the reasonable observer, who would otherwise be unaware of its biblical origin.
Thus, while the district court allowed Ohio to retain its motto and display it on the
statehouse grounds as planned, it could no longer reveal that Jimmy Mastronado
found the phrase in the New Testament.59
C. Sixth Circuit Original Panel Opinion ("ACLU II")
The ACLU appealed the district court's ruling to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals.60 A divided three-judge panel reversed, with each of the three judges
writing separately. Although the majority opinion, written by Judge Cohn,61
acknowledged that the phrase invited many interpretations even within its biblical
context, the two-judge majority found that "With God All Things Are Possible"
ultimately concerned salvation, which it viewed as a uniquely Christian concept.62 To
the majority, Jesus used the phrase to articulate the necessity of faith in God to enter
heaven and achieve salvation, which was "a uniquely Christian thought not shared by
Jews and Moslems." 63
"While the words of the motto may not overtly favor Christianity, as the words of
Jesus they, at a minimum, demonstrate a particular affinity toward Christianity in the
eyes and ears of a reasonable observer-a person knowledgeable about the Christian
Bible and particularly the New Testament." 64 Thus, using a reasonable observer who
was "knowledgeable about the Christian Bible and particularly the New Testament,"
the majority concluded that the Ohio motto endorsed Christianity and was thus
unconstitutional. 65
However, Judge Cohn acknowledged that the motto, when removed from its
biblical context, simply conveyed, "the notion that Ohio has a bright future... [and]
58 ACLUI 20F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1185 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
59 This conclusion is consistent with the district court's view of the reasonable observer's
level of knowledge because the "average" observer would not recognize the motto as a biblical
quotation without the benefit of an express citation to the Bible.
60 SeeACLUII, 210 F.3d 703 (6th Cir. 2000). The state of Ohio, however, did not appeal the
district court's order enjoining it from attributing the source of the motto to the New Testament. As
a result, the case on appeal was more straightforward than the case below because the only issue on
appeal was whether the motto itself, presented without any references to its biblical origins,
endorsed Christianity.
61 The Honorable Avem Cohn, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Michigan, sitting by designation.
62 See ACLU 11, 210 F.3d at 725.
63 Id.




that people ought to be optimistic and hopeful about the future." 66 The majority also
recognized that this secular meaning differed from the motto's meaning "to a reader
of the New Testament acquainted with its text" and to "persons engaged in biblical
discourse or debating a point of scripture." 67 Nevertheless, the majority found the
motto unconstitutional by concluding that a state motto quoting Jesus' sayings in the
New Testament impermissibly endorsed Christianity.
Judge Cohn also rejected the state's argument that the motto merely expressed
"ceremonial deism." Declining to question the line of cases upholding the
constitutionality of the national motto and the Pledge of Allegiance, 68 the majority
summarily concluded that Ohio's motto was unlike these "various forms of
ceremonial deisms" upheld in the past.
69
Judge Merritt's concurring opinion reads more like a theological discourse than a
legal analysis. Judge Merritt first described the "most obvious primary" religious
meaning of Ohio's motto to be a description of a "personal, all-knowing, all-powerful
God [who] intervenes in the daily affairs of individuals and through this miracle of
supernatural intervention makes 'all things possible.' "70 He then described the
secondary meaning of Ohio's motto, in its biblical context, to be the concept of
salvation. Based on either of these interpretations, Judge Merritt agreed that the Ohio
motto is unconstitutional because many non-Christian religions did not believe in
either interpretation of the phrase: an almighty and intervening God, or the concept of
salvation. 71
Moreover, the concurrence found that unlike Ohio's motto, the national motto
"does not specify a personal, all-powerful, all-knowing God which makes 'all things
66 Id. at 724 (quoting defendant's oral argument).
67 Id.
68 See Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that statutes requiring
that the inscription "In God We Trust" appear on all United States currency and coins, and those
declaring the same as to the national motto of the United States, do not violate the Establishment
Clause); O'Hair v. Blumenthal, 588 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (holding the same and
affirming on the basis of the district court opinion at 462 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Tex. 1978)); Aronow
v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding the same); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 692-93 (1984) (adopting the same view in dicta); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
818 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (adopting the same view in dicta); Sch. Dist. of Abington
Twshp., Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303-04 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(adopting the same view in dicta); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,435 n.21 (1962) (adopting the
same view in dicta).
On the other hand, a panel of the Ninth Circuit recently declared the Pledge of Allegiance
unconstitutional in Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir.), judgment stayed (June 27,
2002). See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
69 ACLUII, 210 F.3d at 725.
70 Id. at 728.
71 See id. at 728-29.
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possible' by intervening in daily affairs."'72 Instead, the God in the national motto
could be one of any number of gods, and, unlike Ohio's motto, does not refer to "the
God of particular Christian religious groups." 73 Thus, compared to the more general
interpretation of the national motto, Judge Merritt agreed that the Ohio motto
endorsed Christianity and was unconstitutional.
Judge Nelson dissented. He found Ohio's motto to be no different from the
national motto and, thus, was constitutional. The dissent rejected the majority's notion
of a reasonable observer who could recognize and identify the biblical origins of
Ohio's motto. Instead, the dissent's reasonable observer was, as Justice O'Connor
described," 'an informed member of the community' . . .who is 'aware of the history
and context of the community and forum in which the challenged expression
appears." 74 Although this reasonable observer was better informed than the general
public, that observer "should not be presumed to have an encyclopedic knowledge of
the Old and New Testaments." 75 Implicitly, the dissent's reasonable observer, like the
district court's, would view the phrase in its civic context without the religious gloss
of Matthew 19:26, because that observer would not recognize it as a particular
biblical quotation. Rather, this observer would view the Ohio motto as "remarkably
similar" to the national motto, which is constitutional. 76 Thus, like the district court,
the dissent concluded that the reasonable observer would not view the motto as
endorsing Christianity.
The primary disagreement between the dissent and the majority and concurring
opinions was whether the reasonable observer would view the Ohio motto as a
distinctly Christian phrase, or whether he would view the Ohio motto as a
traditionally acceptable government reference to God like other forms of ceremonial
deism, such as "In God We Trust." The majority and concurrence focused on the
biblical meaning of the phrase because the reasonable observer was described as
having a particular knowledge of Christianity and the New Testament. Consequently,
that observer was able to identify the Ohio motto as a specific phrase from the Bible,
despite the fact that the motto was no longer accompanied by any citation noting its
biblical origins. This observer's exceptional knowledge of the New Testament
necessarily required it to view the Ohio motto as an unconstitutional endorsement of
Christianity.
By contrast, the dissent, like the district court, found that the reasonable observer
would not view the motto as an endorsement of Christianity because that observer
would not realize the phrase could be found in the Christian Bible. Rather, the
dissent's observer, like Justice O'Connor's observer, would understand the civic
7 2 Id. at 729.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 730 (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780-
81 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).




history and context of the Ohio motto. In addition to this civic knowledge, the
dissent's observer also recognized the concept of ceremonial deism and was able to
compare the challenged conduct to that tradition to determine whether the motto was
appropriate. With this greater civic, rather than religious knowledge, the dissent's
observer would simply view Ohio's motto as being no different than other forms of
ceremonial deism, like the national motto, and would thus find the motto
constitutional.
The majority opinion implicitly adopted a modified version of Justice
O'Connor's more knowledgeable reasonable observer. Like Justice O'Connor, the
majority attributed a greater degree of knowledge to its reasonable observer, but then
charged its observer with an extraordinary degree of religious and theological
knowledge, rather than legal or historical knowledge. Even more surprising was the
fact that this reasonable observer's extraordinarily religious knowledge was limited to
an understanding of the New Testament and Christian doctrine and did not extend to
other religions.
To reach this outcome, the majority viewed the reasonable observer as having an
exceptional level of knowledge of Christianity without having similar knowledge of
other religions or an understanding of ceremonial deism. Unlike Justice O'Connor's
well-informed observer, the majority's observer was "a person knowledgeable about
the Christian Bible and particularly the New Testament. '77 Because of this
specialized Christian knowledge, this observer recognized the motto as a phrase from
the New Testament, even when presented to the public in a civic context with no
reference to its biblical origin. Consequently, the Court's majority found that the
motto impermissibly endorsed Christianity and was, thus, unconstitutional.
D. Sixth Circuit En Banc Opinion ("ACLU lII")
The Sixth Circuit sitting en banc vacated the original panel's decision and
affirmed the district court's initial ruling upholding the constitutionality of the Ohio
motto. 78 Like the original panel, the en banc panel was deeply divided and included a
majority opinion, a separate concurring opinion, and two dissents.79 These conflicting
opinions used different versions of the reasonable observer with each opinion
attributing a different type or scope of knowledge to that observer.
77 See id. at 727.
78 See ACLU v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001) (en
banc) ("A CLU III").
79 Judge Nelson delivered the opinion of the court, in which Judges Boggs, Norris,
Suhrheinrich, Siler, Batchelder, Cole, and Gilman, joined. Judge Clay delivered a separate
concurring opinion. Chief Judge Martin and Judge Merritt delivered separate dissenting opinions,
with Judge Martin, Judge Daughtrey, and Judge Moore joining in Judge Merritt's dissent. See id. at
291.
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Judge Nelson, the original dissenting judge, wrote for the majority. His opinion
began with a summary of the original intent of the Establishment Clause, which was
merely to forbid the government establishment of churches and not a prohibition of
general government references to religion. 80 Given the country's tradition of
government references to religion dating back to the founding of the nation, the
majority found that Ohio's motto was an acceptable form of ceremonial deism under
Marsh.81 These governmental acknowledgments of religion are acceptable as long as
they do not "assert a preference for one religious denomination or sect over others." 82
Under this interpretation of the Establishment Clause, and in light of this long
tradition of ceremonial deism, the Ohio motto was clearly constitutional.83
Next, the majority turned to the endorsement test and used two different versions
of the reasonable observer. The first was modeled after Justice Stevens's observer.
This average observer would be "relatively unschooled in the more esoteric reaches of
theology, philosophy, and biblical exegesis."'84 Likewise, the average observer was
not likely "to have an encyclopedic knowledge of press releases issued more than 40
years ago by the late Secretary of State Ted W. Brown." 85 Indeed, the majority noted
that, "most Ohio citizens credited with being aware of 'the history and context' of
their community are unlikely to have even the vaguest notion of the source from
which Ohio's motto was drawn."' 86 Rather, this average observer would find Ohio's
motto to be no more problematic than "In God We Trust" because "both mottoes
would appear to have been cut from the same bolt of cloth."'87 Thus, the average
reasonable observer would not recognize the motto' s biblical origins and would not
view it as an endorsement of Christianity. 88
The majority then viewed the motto through the eyes of Justice O'Connor's
observer. This observer was "an objective observer, acquainted with the text,
legislative history, and implementation of the statute .... 89 As such, this well-
informed observer was:
80 Id. at 293-99.
81 Id. at 299-301.
82 Id. at 299.
83 Id. at 293-99.
84 ACLUIII, 243 F.3d 289, 302 (6th Cit. 2001).
85 Id.
86 Id. The majority also noted that a poll conducted in 1997 using questions framed by the
ACLU revealed that "only about two percent of randomly selected citizens of Summit County,
Ohio, could come reasonably close to recalling the content of Ohio's motto, to say nothing of its
source." Id. at 303 n. 13.
87 Id. at 302.
88 Id. at 299-301. The court noted that: "If our 'reasonable observer' is to bear any reasonable
resemblance to ordinary people, ignorance alone would doubtless provide a sufficient guaranty that
such an observer would not see Ohio's motto as an endorsement of Christianity." Id. at 303.
89 Id. at 302 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 473 U.S. 38,76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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[D]eemed to know about Secretary Brown's press releases and other official
literature identifying the source of the motto, as well as being credited with detailed
knowledge of the text of the New Testament, plus some familiarity with the religious
and philosophical traditions of the various peoples, ancient and modem, who have
contributed to the religious, cultural and philosophical heritage of the State of
Ohio.9
0
Consequently, this second observer was able to recognize that the Ohio motto was
part of a long tradition of ceremonial deism and, likewise, was a phrase common to
several different religions rather than focusing on the Christian meaning of the phrase.
The majority found it "most unlikely that an observer as well informed as this
could discern an endorsement of Christianity in the words of Ohio's motto" because
the motto is similar to other forms of ceremonial deism and can be found in a variety
of non-Christian texts, including the works of Homer, Sophocles, Plutarch, and
Calimachus.9 1 The majority observed that the concept of an all-powerful God, which
had been described below as a Christian concept,92 was not unique to Christianity,
pointing to an affidavit submitted by Professor Thomas P. Kasulis, "whose area of
specialization is the comparative philosophy of religion." 93 Professor Kasulis quoted
"passages from the Hindu Upanishads and the Egyptian Akhenaten's Hymn to Aten
(the latter written almost a millennium and a half before the Christian era) to
demonstrate that the idea of an all-powerful God was not confined to Semitic
religions such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam." 94 Thus, neither the phrase nor its
meaning were unique to Christianity and, consequently, could not be seen as an
endorsement of that religion.
In short, because the majority's well-informed reasonable observer recognized
the Ohio motto as a generic religious phrase used in a variety of Christian and non-
Christian texts and was similar to other forms of ceremonial deism, it concluded that
"no well informed observer could reasonably take Ohio's motto to be an official
endorsement of the Christian religion." 95 It was clear that the majority's opinion was
90 ACLUIII, 243 F.3d 289, 303 (6th Cir. 2001).
91 Id. at 303-05. Dr. David Belcastro, "an expert in biblical hermeneutics," and Professor
Thomas Kasulis, a specialist in the "comparative philosophy of religion," identified non-Christian
antecedents for the motto. Id. at 303-04. The en banc majority viewed their testimony as "that of a
reasonable observer who speaks with some authority on a subject in which he happens to be
exceptionally well versed." Id. at 305. This, in turn, led the en banc majority to find that such a
well-informed observer would not view Ohio's motto as an endorsement of Christianity. See id.
92 See ACLUII, 210 F.3d 703,728-30 (6th Cir. 2000); ACLUI, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1178
(S.D. Ohio 1998).
93 ACLUIII, 243 F.3d at 304.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 305. For this reason, the en banc majority's well-informed observer would have
upheld the constitutionality of the Ohio motto even if the district court had not enjoined the state's
occasional reference to the motto's biblical history in pamphlets and booklets. The original panel
had criticized the district court's decision to enjoin the state from attributing the motto to the New
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based in large part on its endorsement analysis because it went on to find that the
Ohio motto was also constitutional under the Lemon test for largely the same reasons
and without much further analysis. 96
There were two dissenting opinions, the first written by Chief Judge Boyce
Martin, Jr. and the second by Judge Gilbert Merritt. Judge Martin expressed a general
opposition to "state-sponsored religious imagery" because it detracted from "true
religion." 97 Judge Martin's dissent, however, did not quarrel with the majority's
characterization of the reasonable observer. Moreover, instead of focusing on the
effect of state-sponsored references to religion on individuals using the endorsement
test, the first dissent focused on the effect of such state activities on religion itself and
rejected the majority's characterization of the original intent of the Establishment
Clause. 98
As he did in his concurring opinion in the original panel, Judge Merritt in his
dissent attempted to distinguish the "God" in the national motto from the "God" in
the Ohio motto: 99
While the phrase "In God We Trust" refers broadly to a shared human yearning for
the spiritual, the Ohio motto conveys a sectarian view of God as interventionist,
active and omnipotent. The national motto does not specify a personal, all-powerful,
all-knowing God who makes "all things possible" by intervening in daily affairs.
The God in whom we trust could be the god of Jefferson's deism or even the laws of
science or the cosmology of Newton or Einstein. It does not define the god of any
religion. The god of the silver coin and the dollar bill-"In Whom We Trust"-may
be drawn from any of the gods of the world's vast pantheon of divinity that has
accumulated from Greek times to the present. 100
Judge Merritt then discussed the application of the endorsement test by focusing
on the meaning of the Ohio motto in its biblical context. Like the original panel's
Testament, even though that issue was not before the court because the state of Ohio had not
appealed that ruling. There was also no evidence that any attempt was ever made or planned by the
state to present the motto to the public with a citation to the New Testament, rather than confming
its biblical references to a few pamphlets summarizing the history of the motto. However, even if
the well-informed observer were aware of the fact that the motto was originally drawn from the
New Testament, that observer would nevertheless understand the motto was not an endorsement of
Christianity because the same or similar phrases could be found in a variety of non-Christian and
even pre-Christian texts.
96 See id. at 306-08.
971d. at 312.
98 See id.
99 The second dissent also contested the majority's interpretation of the original intent of the
Establishment Clause and was not willing to concede that the national motto passes the non-
endorsement test of the Establishment Clause. See ACLU III, 243 F.3d 289, 313-15 (6th Cir.
2001).
100 Id. at 315.
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majority opinion, Judge Merritt again found the phrase was a recitation of Jesus'
words describing salvation using an observer charged with extraordinary biblical
knowledge. ' o' Because the motto was a recitation of Jesus' words describing an all-
powerful and intervening God and the concept of salvation, Judge Merritt found it to
be a distinctly Christian message. As a result, Judge Merritt viewed the majority's
approval of the Ohio motto as an "encroachment on religious freedom" that created
"establishment [of religion] by increments."1 02
Judge Eric Clay filed a separate concurrence. He disputed Judge Merritt's
argument that the Ohio motto, "With God All Things Are Possible" could be
distinguished from the national motto, "In God We Trust." First, Judge Clay noted
both mottos "may reasonably be understood to refer to 'God' as an omnipotent one
who intervenes in human affairs... or as one who does not intervene in human
affairs but is looked to for spiritual comfort."' 103 Second, Judge Clay noted both
mottos could also be traced to the Bible because phrases similar to the national motto
could be found both in the Old and New Testaments. 10 4 Thus, the concurrence
disputed the second dissent's attempt to distinguish the national motto, the
constitutionality of which was not disputed, from the Ohio motto.
Like the original panel opinions, the division amongst the en banc judges was
based in large part on a fundamental disagreement over the knowledge to be
attributed to the reasonable observer when applying the endorsement test. Those
judges who found the Ohio motto to be unconstitutional attributed a highly
particularized knowledge about Christianity to the reasonable observer who was then
able to identify the motto as a phrase in the New Testament. By contrast, the judges
who found the motto to be constitutional attributed a more generalized knowledge to
the reasonable observer. Either that generalized observer, like Justice Stevens's
average passerby, was too ill-informed to recognize the motto as a biblical quotation,
or was well enough informed, similar to Justice O'Connor's observer, to realize the
motto could be found in a variety of non-Christian texts. Implicit in both these
observers, however, was the fact that both needed to understand and accept
ceremonial deism: the average observer simply analogized the challenged phrase to
other accepted practices, while the well-informed observer was smart enough to know
that similar forms of ceremonial deism date back hundreds of years and are part of
this nation's history.
101 See id. at 315-16.
102 Id. at 318. The second dissent also criticized the district court's injunction preventing the
state of Ohio from attributing the state motto to the New Testament, describing the injunction as
"tantamount to an admission of unconstitutionality" and "a tacit recognition of the Christian nature
of the phrase." Id. at 315. However, as noted above, the validity of the district court's injunction
against the state of Ohio was not on appeal. See supra note 88.
103 ACLU III, 243 F.3d at 311.
104 See id.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF CEREMONIAL DEISM AND THE
REASONABLE OBSERVER
The Ohio motto case demonstrates the potential manipulation of the endorsement
test's reasonable observer to strike down long-accepted traditions of civic piety and
ceremonial deism. Federal courts have often upheld different forms of ceremonial
deism, including legislative prayers, 105 Christmas holiday decorations, 06 and "In
God We Trust."' 1 7 When properly applied, the endorsement test plays the valuable
role of reconciling our heritage of civic piety with our Constitutional commitments to
religious tolerance and pluralism. Through the eyes of a reasonable observer familiar
with America's religious diversity and ceremonial deism traditions, like the en banc
majority's observer, courts can readily distinguish permissible embodiments of
ceremonial deism from impermissible endorsements of religion.
A. The Tradition of Government References to God and Religion
Religion has always been important in American government. In his Farewell
Address to the nation, George Washington noted that religion, as a source of morality,
is "a necessary spring of popular government."108 Even the famed Frenchman Alexis
de Tocqueville observed that Americans hold religion "to be indispensable to the
maintenance of republican institutions." 10 9 The Supreme Court, too, has
acknowledged that Americans "are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being."1 0 Consequently, federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have
repeatedly upheld government use of religious references and symbolism as
constitutionally permissible forms of "ceremonial deism."'" This American tradition
105 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
106 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573 (1989).
107 See Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970); O'Hair v. Murray, 588 F.2d
1144 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, O'Hair v. Blumenthal, 442 U.S. 930 (1979); Gaylor v. United States,
74 F.3d 214 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1211 (1996).
108 GEORGE WASHINGTON, FAREWELLADDRESS (1796), reprinted in 100 KEY DOCUMENTS IN
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 67, 71 (Peter B. Levy ed., 1994); see also Library of Congress, Religion
and the Founding of the American Republic: Religion and the Federal Govemment, The Farewell
Address, available at http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel06.html (last updated June 3, 1998).
President Washington's Farewell Address is considered an important document in American
history because it made several recommendations regarding foreign affairs and govemance, which
had a strong influence on American politicians.
109 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,'DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 232 (Henry Reeve trans., Sauders &
Otley 1835).
110 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
111 See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (upholding constitutionality of
legislative prayers and a publicly funded chaplain for the legislature).
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of ceremonial deism remains firmly entrenched in contemporary American life and
dates back as far as the Revolutionary War itself.
There is also no doubt that religion was a powerful influence during the
Revolutionary War. References to God were commonly found on battle flags,
including one emblazoned with the declaration: "Resistance To Tyrants Is Obedience
To God."' 1 2 The historic Liberty Bell in Philadelphia is inscribed with a quotation
from the Old Testament: "Proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto all inhabitants
thereof."' 1 3 The fledgling government also paid chaplains to minister to the
revolutionary troops, a tradition that continues today in America's armed forces. 114
Even the Treaty of Paris, which was signed in 1783 and formally ended the American
Revolution, explicitly referred to "Divine Providence." 115 Presumably, under the
original panel's view of the First Amendment and the endorsement test, neither the
Liberty Bell nor the revolutionary battle flag could be displayed by the government
because both would be viewed by the well-informed Christian observer as an
endorsement of Christianity. Likewise, the existence of military chaplains, which
would clearly be constitutional under Marsh, and any reference to a divine power in
historical documents, like the Treaty of Paris, would also be exorcised from
government.
Government references to religious imagery and concepts also flourished in the
early days of the Republic. The Articles of Confederation, signed in 1778, explicitly
referred to the "Great Governor of the World."' 16 The Continental-Confederation
Congress, which existed from 1774 to 1789, began the tradition of appointing
chaplains from different denominations to lead legislative prayers. The first Congress
convened under the U.S. Constitution voted on April 15, 1789, to continue this
practice. 17 This tradition of legislative prayers led by clergy paid for by the
112 See Religion and the Founding of the American Republic: Religion and the American
Revolution, Gostelowe Standard, c. 1776, at http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/relO3.html (last
updated June 3, 1998); see also EDWARD. W. RICHARDSON, STANDARDS AND COLORS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 49 (1982).
113 Leviticus 25:10 (King James).
114 See Library of Congress, Religion and the Congress of the Confederation, 1774-89:
Religion and the American Revolution, Congressional Resolution Paying Military Personnel
(Apr. 22, 1782), at http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/re04.html (last updated June 3, 1998).
115 SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JAY'S TREATY: A STUDY IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY 442
(1962), available at http://www.freedomshrine.com/documents/paris.html (last visited Feb. 23,
2003).
116 ART. OF CONFED. art. XIII, reprinted in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: COMPRISING THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, AND THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS 17 (George A. Glynn compiler, 1894), available
at http://www.usconstitution.net/articles.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2003).
117 See 1 ANNALS OFCONG. 19 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
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government continues today in the U.S. Congress and many state legislatures, and has
been expressly upheld in Marsh. 118
The Framers of the Constitution intended the Establishment Clause to permit
government references to God and religious symbols. Thomas Jefferson himself, who
first articulated the notion of a "wall of separation between church and state,"
famously invoked God in the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to
be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness." 119 Jefferson also referred to God in the preamble to the Virginia Bill For
Establishing Religious Freedom: "Whereas Almighty God Hath created the mind
free." The Bill condemns coercion of religious belief as "a departure from the plan of
the Holy author of our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind.., chose not
to propagate it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power to do."' 120 As
such, Jefferson acknowledged that it was God's will that religious freedom be
protected and that the people were "endowed with certain unalienable rights," rather
than reflecting a desire for a total separation of government and religion. Indeed,
Jefferson went so far as to propose that the Seal of the United States include a biblical
image of the "Children of Israel in the Wilderness, led by a Cloud by day, and a Pillar
of Fire by night." 12'
Likewise, the first House of Representatives proposed the First Amendment on
one day, and the very next day proposed a presidential proclamation of
"Thanksgiving and Prayer." That same legislative body also allowed for the
appointment of a chaplain for the military. President Jefferson, in an 1803 treaty with
the Kaskaskia Indians, provided money for a church and religious needs for that tribe.
Similarly, President Monroe in a treaty with the Wyandotte Indians, granted U.S. land
118 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
119 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
120 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (June 12, 1779)
reprinted in 5 FOUNDERS' CONSTrrUTION 77 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987).
Thomas Jefferson wrote of a "wall of separation" between church and state, which some construe
as a requirement for the strict separation between the government and religion, in a letter to the
Danbury Baptists in 1802 more than a decade after the First Amendment was ratified by the states.
ACLU, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1183 n. 14 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (citations omitted). Although Jefferson
wrote the letter and authored the Declaration of Independence, he had nothing to do with the
drafting of the First Amendment because he was in France at the time. See id. at 1183.
121 See RICHARD S. PATTERSON & RICHARDSON DOUGALL, THE EAGLE AND THE SHIELD: A
HISTORY OFTHE GREAT SEALOFTHE UNITED STATES 16-17 (1976); see also Library of Congress,
Religion and the Congress of the Confederation, 1774-89: Religion and the American Revolution,
Proposed Great Seal of the United States: "Rebellion to Tyrants Is Obedience to God. ", drawing
by Benson Lossing, for HARPER'S NEW MONTHLY MAG. (July 1856), at http://lcweb.loc.gov/
exhibits/religion/re04.html (last updated June 3, 1998). The image depicts the Exodus of the
Children of Israel from Egypt in Exodus 13:21 (King James).
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to the Catholic Church of St. Anne of Detroit because of the tribe's attachment to that
church. 122
Early American laws and treaties also evidenced the importance of religion. The
Northwest Ordinance, which expanded the country west of the Ohio River when it
was signed in 1787, expressly noted that "[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge, being
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means
of education shall forever be encouraged."' 123 Likewise, the Emancipation
Proclamation invokes the "gracious favor of Almighty God" in liberating slaves and
putting an end to the scourge of slavery. 124
Even today, references to God and religious symbols adorn many prominent
federal buildings in Washington D.C. The inner dome in the U.S. Capitol Building,
for example, features an ornate fresco, "The Apotheosis of Washington," which
depicts George Washington ascending to the heavens surrounded by, among other
things, angels and cherubs. The halls of the U.S. Capitol and Supreme Court
buildings also display images of historical figures who contributed to the underlying
principles of American law. Among them are Moses, who is credited with receiving
the Ten Commandments, and Mohammed, credited with receiving the Islamic holy
book, al-Qur'an.
Government references to a generic God are also commonplace. The reverse side
of the Great Seal of the United States, which is printed on every dollar bill, contains
the "Eye of Providence" above a pyramid with the phrase "Annuit Coeptis," which
translates as "God has favored our undertaking." The Supreme Court and other
federal courts, which are charged with interpreting the Establishment Clause, open
their proceedings with the familiar cry "God save the United States and this
Honorable Court." Judges, elected officials, military officers, and other public
servants take an oath of office that ends with the familiar pledge, "[s]o help me
God."'125 Immigrants becoming naturalized citizens and witnesses who take the stand
122 See Library of Congress, Religion and the Founding of the American Republic: Religion
and the Congress of the Confederation, 1774-89, Congressional Resolution Paying Military
Personnel, at http:lflcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/relO4.html ("Congress appointed chaplains for
itself and the armed forces, sponsored the publication of a Bible, imposed Christian morality on the
armed forces, and granted public lands to promote Christianity among the Indians."). See also
http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/vc006495.jpg for an image of the Congressional resolution
authorizing the payment of military personnel, including military chaplains.
123 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, art. I1 (July 13, 1787), reprinted in EQUAL PROTECTION AND
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIENCE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 30 (Robert P.
Green ed., 2000), available at http://www.freedomshrine.com/documents/northwest.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2003).
124 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION (Jan. 1, 1863), reprinted in 100
KEY DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 101, at 164, available at
http://www.archives.gov/exhibit-hal/featured-documents/emancipation-prclamation/tanscript.
html (last visited Feb. 23, 2003).
125 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2000).
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in most state and federal courts also take an oath ending in the same pledge, "so help
me God."
The federal government even observes numerous religious traditions. The White
House hosts celebrations of Christmas, Chanukah, and the Muslim holy month of
Ramadan. Every president since Harry Truman has officially declared a National Day
of Prayer as an annual, nationwide event. 126 The federal government, like most cities
and states, also erects holiday displays celebrating Chanukah and Christmas, in
addition to declaring Sunday to be a day of rest. And the tradition continues today, as
the events after September 11 demonstrate.
The federal government is not alone in its traditional references to God.127
Almost every state constitution refers to "God" or some divine power or authority. 128
Ohio's own constitution begins, "We, the People of the State of Ohio, grateful to
Almighty God for our freedom .... 129 In addition to Ohio, there are several other
state mottos that expressly refer to a divine power. For example, the Arizona state
motto reads "Ditat Deus" (God enriches); the Colorado motto reads "Nil Sine
Numine" (Nothing without Providence); Connecticut's motto reads "Qui Transtulit
Sustinet" (He who transplanted, still sustains); and South Dakota's motto is simply
"Under God the people rule."' 130
Likewise, religious symbols grace many state government buildings. The
Nebraska Supreme Court building includes a symbolic light fixture depicting the Ten
Commandments. A painting of Moses receiving the Ten Commandments hangs
above the bench in the Minnesota Supreme Court. 131 Similarly, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court building includes two murals. One, "The Decalogue," includes an
image of Moses receiving the Ten Commandments, while the second, "The
126 See National Day of Prayer, Pub. L. No. 82-324,66 Stat. 64 (1952) (codified as amended
at 36 U.S.C. § 119 (2000)) ("That the President shall set aside and proclaim a suitable day each
year, other than a Sunday, as a National Day of Prayer, on which the people of the United States
may turn to God in prayer and meditation at churches, in groups, and as individuals.").
127 Government references to a single "God" are also not unique to American government
and can even be found in more polytheistic countries. That fact was clearly apparent in the Ohio
motto case because the decision to place Ohio's motto on the statehouse was inspired by a
religious phrase placed on a government building in India. Governor Voinovich was inspired to
inscribe Ohio's motto on the statehouse after viewing the motto "God's work is government work"
on a public building in India. India has a polytheistic Hindu majority and a large Muslim minority
as well as substantial Buddhist, Sikh, Jain, and other religious minorities. ACLUII1, 243 F.3d 289,
292 (6th Cir. 2001).
128 See id. at 296 n.6.
129 See OHIO CONST. pmbl. ("We, the people of the State of Ohio, grateful to Almighty God
for our freedom, to secure its blessings and promote our common welfare, do establish this
Constitution.").
130 See BRIAN BURRELL, THE WORDS WE LIVE By 300-01 (1997).
131 Minnesota Court Information Office, Minnesota Supreme Court 12, available at
www.courts.state.nm.us/cio/scourt.doc (last visited Feb. 23, 2003).
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Beatitudes," contains an image of Jesus teaching his disciples. 132 The West Virginia
Supreme Court includes a quotation from Abraham Lincoln that reads, "Firmness in
the right as God gives us to see the right."' 133
In many of these examples, the "God" could be Muslim as easily as it could be
Christian or Jewish. These examples also illustrate the United States' longstanding
traditions of ceremonial deism and public acceptance of civic piety. The public is
accustomed to such generic references to God in official oaths, mottos, and public
artwork, and expects its leaders to observe symbolically the holidays celebrated by
America's many faiths. 134
Indeed, any genuinely religious significance of these symbols has long since been
replaced by a generic civic meaning that endorses no specific religion. 135 For
example, the official memorials for the victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks,
though led by various religious leaders, were viewed as civic ceremonies solemnizing
a national catastrophe. The Ohio motto's generic reference to "God," as shorthand for
faith in general, fits squarely within this constitutional tradition of ceremonial deism
and civic piety. For this reason, it is important for courts to attribute to the
endorsement test's reasonable observer a general knowledge and understanding of
ceremonial deism, rather than cabining that observer's knowledge to any single
religion at the expense of history, culture, and tradition.
B. The Original Panel Majority's Unacceptable "Christian Scholar" 136
Significantly, the original panel majority avoided challenging the constitutionality
of many forms of ceremonial deism that have survived judicial scrutiny in the past. In
fact, the majority implicitly accepted the premise that generic references to religion by
132 THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 10 (1999) (on file with the Pennsylvania
Historical and Museum Commission), available at http://www.courts.state.pa.us/lndex/Supreme
photogallery9.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2003).
133 SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS INFO. SERVS., THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST
VIRGINIA 16 (Michelle T. Mensore ed., 2002), available at http://www.state.wv.us/
wvsca/chambers.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2003).
134 Consider, for example, the strong public outcry over the Town of Kensington, Maryland's
decision to ban Santa Claus, a generic symbol of the holidays, from its holiday parade due to
complaints from two families who said they did not celebrate Christmas. See Town Meeting, TOwN
KENSINGTON J. (Maryland), Nov. 2001, http://www.tok.org.tokjoumal.html. Not surprisingly, that
decision was quickly reversed and Santa was allowed to make his traditional appearance.
135 For example, "God" is a term used loosely in everyday phrases such as "God Bless you"
to excuse a sneeze, or "God Forbid," which is a phrase found in the Old Testament.
136 For another article critiquing the original panel's decision, see Theologos Verginis, Note,
ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board: Is There Salvation for the Establishment
Clause? "With God All Things Are Possible", 34 AKRON L. REv. 741 (2001).
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government, like the national motto, are constitutional. 137 Rather than confront the
obvious similarities between the Ohio motto and other established forms of
ceremonial deism, the majority manipulated the endorsement test to strike down the
motto as an endorsement of Christianity without addressing its status as an expression
of ceremonial deism.
In order to strike down the Ohio motto under the endorsement test, the majority
first had to conclude that a reasonable observer would view the motto as endorsing
Christianity. To reach this result, the majority engineered a "reasonable observer"
akin to a "Christian Scholar." 138 This Christian Scholar was not an average
reasonable person like Justice Stevens's observer, or even a well-informed observer
similar to Justice O'Connor's observer. Rather, this Christian Scholar version of a
reasonable observer had a highly specialized and extraordinary knowledge of biblical
texts and Christian theology, yet lacked any such knowledge of any other religious
faiths or civic traditions. This strange imbalance necessarily dictated the outcome of
the endorsement test and condemned the Ohio motto from the beginning.
Employing this "Christian Scholar" to guide the endorsement test was
unprecedented and untenable. First, the majority cited no authority for weighting the
reasonable observer with concentrated knowledge of Christianity or any other single
faith. Even Justice O'Connor's rather well-informed observer was aware of the legal
history and civic context of the challenged government action, rather than purporting
to be an expert in any single religion to the exclusion of others. The Establishment
Clause itself does not differentiate between religions and simply bars the
establishment of "religion" generally. 139
137 SeeACLUII, 210 F.3d 703,726 (6th Cir. 2000) ("In sum, fairly read and understood, the
State of Ohio has adopted a motto which crosses the line from evenhandedness toward all
religions, to a preference for Christianity, in the form of Christian text. Thus, it is an endorsement
of Christianity by the State of Ohio.").
138 This observer charged with knowledge about Christianity and the New Testament in
particular is deemed a "Christian Scholar" to differentiate it from the concept of a "Christian"
observer. Some have argued that a Christian observer would bias the endorsement test against non-
Christian religions because a Christian would not perceive an endorsement of its own religion as
offensive or unconstitutional. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrULONAL LAW
§ 14-15, at 1292-94 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing the reasonable observer should view the challenged
conduct from the perspective of a non-adherent because "actions that reasonably offend non-
adherents may seem so natural and proper to adherents as to blur into the background noise of
society"). By contrast, a Christian Scholar is not necessarily a Christian who is not offended by his
own religion, but is an objective scholar who is able to recognize the Christian significance of
religious references when others likely would not.
139 Indeed, many argue persuasively that the Establishment Clause merely forbids the
establishment of a national or federal church similar to that of the Church of England. See, e.g.,
ACLU III, 243 F.3d 289, 293 (6th Cir. 2001):
Whatever else may have been understood to be prohibited with the adoption of the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause, it is clear that the principal thrust of the prohibition was
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Second, the original panel's "Christian Scholar" approach is inconsistent with the
settled constitutionality of ceremonial deism. Although the majority's opinion skirted
the issue of ceremonial deism, its methodology directly conflicts with prior rulings
upholding legislative prayer, the national motto, and other embodiments of
ceremonial deism. Because the original panel's Christian Scholar could trace the Ohio
motto to the New Testament, he necessarily viewed the motto as an endorsement of
Christianity-the motto's secular and non-Christian meanings notwithstanding. This
same observer would also recognize the biblical origin of the national motto,
disregard its civic heritage, and find official proclamations such as "In God We Trust"
unconstitutional. Nothing in our First Amendment jurisprudence commands this
result, however. While the Supreme Court has debated the depth of the reasonable
observer's knowledge, no justice has ever suggested that the observer's expertise be
concentrated in Christianity or any other religion.
Third, the original panel's use of the "Christian Scholar" was simply
unreasonable because that observer was surprisingly well-versed in Christian text and
doctrine, and yet was strikingly ignorant of the Ohio motto's antecedents in other
literary, religious, and civic traditions. A true theologian would understand that many
core Christian principles predate Christianity and are not unique to Christianity.
Indeed, the Ohio motto has its roots in a variety of historical non-Christian texts,
many of which pre-date Christianity. For example, Homer's Odyssey, which predates
the New Testament by roughly 800 years, contains the phrase, "with the Gods, all
things are possible." 140 Callimachus wrote a similar phrase in the third century B.C.,
which read, "If thou knowest God, thou knowest that everything is possible for God
to do.'' 14 1 Nearly 500 years before the birth of Christ, Sophocles also wrote, "When a
god works, all is possible."' 142 Likewise, the Old Testament includes many similar
passages, such as "I know that thou canst do every thing." 143 Finally, the Islamic holy
book, al-Qur'an, includes an oft-repeated refrain, "For God Hath power over all
things."' 44
Quite simply, a truly reasonable observer with the expertise to recognize the Ohio
motto as a biblical quotation would also recognize that "With God All Things Are
Possible" is common to diverse religious traditions. Moreover, a truly reasonable
observer would recognize a motto's generic reference to God for what it is: an
to prevent any establishment by the national government of an official religion, including an
established church such as that which existed in England at the time the American colonies
won their independence from the Crown.
Id.
140 HOMER, ODYSSEY 367 (A.T. Murray trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1960).
141 Callimachus, Fragmenta Incertae, No. 27, quoted in, BURTON STEVENSON, THE HOME
BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 784 (10th ed. 1967).
142 ACLU III, 243 F.3d at 303.
143 Job 42:2 (King James).
144 Sura 2:148.
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embodiment of a long tradition of ceremonial deism that cannot be reasonably
construed to endorse any single faith. While the well-informed observer would
appreciate the Ohio motto's diverse antecedents and civic role, a reasonable, average
passerby would casually dismiss the motto as a generic form of ceremonial deism like
the national motto. The original panel' s Christian Scholar did neither.
Fourth, the Christian Scholar approach inescapably biases the endorsement test
against Christianity. Obviously, because the Christian Scholar is more likely to
recognize Christian texts or symbols, Christian symbolism is particularly vulnerable
to constitutional attack. More troubling, the Christian Scholar tilts the endorsement
test against symbols and ideas embraced by Christians and non-Christians alike.
Because the Christian Scholar recognizes "Christian" connotations while ignoring
other religious and secular meanings, expressions that unite diverse faiths and
traditions may be struck down as endorsing Christianity. Ironically, that same
observer would also be less likely to recognize actual government endorsement of a
single non-Christian religion. In essence, this "Christian Scholar" approach creates an
endorsement test that itself endorses non-Christian views over Christianity.
Fifth, the Christian Scholar approach improperly shifts the endorsement test from
assessing official use of religious imagery in a civic context to interpreting religious
imagery in a specific religious context. Under Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit
precedent, 145 the endorsement test assesses government use of religious symbolism in
the civic context created by the government rather than any specific religious context
from which the symbolism may arguably derive. For example, in Brooks v City of
Oak Ridge, 146 the Sixth Circuit considered whether a bronze Friendship Bell given by
Japan to the City of Oak Ridge, Tennessee unconstitutionally endorsed Buddhism.
The court found the bell to be a Buddhist religious symbol. Indeed, the bell's casting
ceremony conducted by monks in Japan was intended to impart a "soul" to the
bell. 147 Despite the clear Buddhist symbolism, the Sixth Circuit found "the
reasonable observer would not understand the Friendship Bell display, in context, to
convey the message that the government of Oak Ridge endorses Buddhism," even
assuming such an observer was aware of the Buddhist casting ceremony. 148 Instead,
the Friendship Bell was found to endorse "peace and friendship with Japan," which
was noted on a plaque that accompanied the Friendship Bell. 149 As Brooks suggests,
a truly reasonable observer evaluating an otherwise religious symbol in a civic context
145 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 599-600 (1989) (discussing
constitutionality of a creche as it appeared as a display on the grand staircase of a courthouse);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 682 (1984) (viewing creche display as part of a business district
Christmas display); Brooks v. City of Oak Ridge, 222 F.3d 259 (6th Cir. 2000).
146 222 F.3d 259 (6th Cir. 2000).
147 See id. at 263.




created by the state can distinguish the symbol's non-religious meaning in its civic
context from other meanings that might arise in explicitly religious contexts.
The Christian Scholar approach, however, mistakenly imports the Christian
religious context into the civic context, rather than considering the historical and civic
context as described by Justice O'Connor. Because the Christian Scholar recognizes
the Christian origins of ideas and images to the exclusion of non-Christian and secular
sources, the Christian Scholar necessarily focuses on the biblical meaning of the
motto. Yet, what Jesus may or may not have meant two millennia ago is not relevant
to the endorsement test today. What is truly relevant is the reasonable observer's
perception of the motto in its civic context created by the state of Ohio, a context
necessarily drawn from our traditions of ceremonial deism. By charging the
reasonable observer with the lopsided expertise of a Christian Scholar, the original
panel majority was led to focus on the specifically Christian context of the motto.
Consequently, the original panel's opinions striking down the Ohio motto read more
like a theological dispute concerning what Jesus meant, rather than a legal question
concerning the reasonable observer's perspective.
Finally, the Christian Scholar approach risks discrediting the endorsement test
with the bench and the general public. Public reaction to the original panel's decision
to strike down the Ohio motto was negative because most people understood the
motto to be a generic and acceptable reference to religion, like the national motto and
other forms of ceremonial deism. After the original panel struck down the Ohio motto
as unconstitutional, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution by a vote
of 333 to 27 urging the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse the opinion and rule the Ohio
motto constitutional. 150 In fact, the Ohio Poll, sponsored by the University of
Cincinnati, found that an overwhelming majority (88 percent) of Ohioans who were
aware of the original panel decision disagreed with it. 151 Public opposition to the
original panel's ruling was in no way limited to Christians. The Council on
American-Islamic Relations issued a press release stating that the Ohio motto does not
endorse a single religion and is common to most religions, including Islam. 152
Because Americans value and accept our traditions of civic piety and ceremonial
deism, they will distrust freshly created judicial doctrines that threaten these cherished
traditions.
150 See H.R. Res. 494, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., 148 CONG. REc. H2606 (daily ed. May 4,
2000).
151 See Press Release, Institute for Policy Research (Univ. of Cincinnati), Ohioans Offer
Opinions on State Motto Controversy (July 16, 2000) (available from the University of Cincinnati,
Institute for Policy Research); see also Associated Press, Poll Finds Motto Ruling Unpopular,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 16, 2000, http://enquirer.com/editions/2000/07/16/
loc-pollifmdsmotto.html.
152 See Muslim Group Defends Ohio's God-Centered Motto, CATHOLIC WORLD NEws, at
www.cwnews.com/browse/2000/05/12870.htm (May 5, 2000).
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The en banc majority opinion, by contrast, is more consistent with the traditional
use of general religious references and imagery that date back to the founding of this
nation, while taking into consideration the dangers of allowing government
inappropriately to endorse one religion over another. The en banc majority struck this
delicate balance by using a reasonable observer charged with more common sense
than biblical expertise. This observer was intelligent enough to view the Ohio motto
in the context of government's traditional use of ceremonial deism, but was not given
the extraordinary ability to recognize the phrase as a quotation from the New
Testament when displayed in its civic, rather than biblical, context. Consequently, the
en banc majority's reasonable observer stood in the shoes of citizens who, when
viewing the Ohio motto engraved on the walkway to the Ohio statehouse, would not
perceive the motto as impermissibly endorsing Christianity. Rather, that observer
simply concluded that the phrase was essentially no different than other mottos and
government references to religion, which also refer to a seemingly generic "God."
C. The Growing Confusion in the Federal Courts
The Sixth Circuit is not the only circuit struggling with proper application of the
several Establishment Clause tests created by the Supreme Court. This confusion over
which test to apply continues today throughout the federal courts and has led to
several highly-contentious cases, including the recent Ninth Circuit case that struck
down as unconstitutional the phrase "under God," in the Pledge of Allegiance. Not
surprisingly, Congress, the President, and the vast majority of Americans of all faiths
were quick to condemn the Ninth Circuit's opinion, particularly in light of the long
line of federal cases that either expressly or implicitly upheld the constitutionality of
that Pledge.153
153 Like the Ohio motto case, the U.S. Congress immediately condemned the Ninth Circuit's
opinion striking down the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance by passing resolutions
condemning that judicial opinion. See S. Res. 292,107th Cong., 148 CONG. REc. S6105 (dailyed.
June 27, 2002) (a resolution expressing support for the Pledge of Allegiance and passed by a vote
of 99-0); H.R. Res. 459, 107th Cong., 148 CONG. REc. H4130 (daily ed. June 28, 2002)
(expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that Newdow v. U.S. Congress was
erroneously decided, and for other purposes). Indeed, Congress is even considering various
legislation proposing a Constitutional Amendment declaring the phrase "under God" in the Pledge
of Allegiance constitutional. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 103, 107th Cong., 148 CONG. REc. H4325
(daily ed. June 28, 2002) (proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States with
respect to the Pledge of Allegiance); H.R.J. Res. 104, 107th Cong., 148 CONG. REc. H4325 (daily
ed. June 28, 2002) (proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to protect the
Pledge of Allegiance); H.R.J. Res. 108, 107th Cong., 148 CONG. REc. H5790 (daily ed. July 25,
2002 pt. 11) (proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to guarantee the
right to use and recite the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag and the national motto).
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In Newdow v. U.S. Congress,154 the father of a young girl challenged a policy
adopted by the girl's school district that required teachers to lead their students in
reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. 155 Although the students were not required to recite
the Pledge, the father argued that his daughter was harmed when she was forced to
"watch and listen as her state-employed teacher in her state-run school leads her
classmates in a ritual proclaiming that there is a God, and that our's [sic] is 'one
nation under God.' ",156 The Ninth Circuit majority applied the endorsement test to
determine the constitutionality of the phrase "under God," in addition to applying
other Establishment Clause tests. 15 7 Although the Ninth Circuit did not conclude that
the phrase unconstitutionally endorsed Christianity, it did conclude that the phrase
endorsed monotheism and, thus, impermissibly endorsed religion in general.158 Such
a generic reference to a God, the court reasoned, would make atheists in this country
uncomfortable and feel like "outsiders, not full members of the political
community."' 159 Thus, it was found to unconstitutionally endorse religion.
Surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit failed to discuss the perspective of the reasonable
observer. Rather, the Ninth Circuit implicitly used an observer who was, in effect, an
atheist viewing the pledge. To an atheist, the reference to God would be a reference to
divine power that did not, in their mind, exist. Consequently, to an atheist who is
highly sensitive to any official reference to the concept of religion in general, whether
Christian or Satanic, would be offensive.
Once again, the court confused the application of the endorsement test by failing
to attribute to the reasonable observer any knowledge or understanding of ceremonial
deism and its historical role in American political discourse. Consequently, the Ninth
Circuit's reasonable observer would find unconstitutional all forms of ceremonial
deism, from the God referred to on American coins to the "Divine power" and
"Creator" referred to in the Declaration of Independence. To avoid such an
unthinkable outcome where judges, who themselves invoke the name of God when
swearing an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States, would seek to
rewrite America's history and traditions once thought to be unassailable. This God is
the same God used by the Founding Fathers to justify the unalienable right of
Americans to the pursuit of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," and the same
Almighty used to put an end to slavery.
Like the Ohio motto case, the Ninth Circuit's divided panel opinion and
subsequent actions evinces the growing confusion in the federal courts over how to
apply the endorsement test by failing to attribute to the reasonable observer a basic
154 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002).
15 5 Id. at 600.
156 Id. at 601.
15 7 See id. at 605-11.
158Id. at 609.
15 9 Id. at 608 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
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knowledge and understanding of ceremonial deism as a protected, government
tradition that is far from the unconstitutional establishment of religion.' 60 For this
reason, the Supreme Court needs to step forward to define more clearly the
endorsement test's reasonable observer before the federal courts implicitly overrule
the Supreme Court's decision in Marsh and destroy the history and tradition that
helped form, and now sustain this nation.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ohio motto case should have been a simple case if for no other reason than
the fact that the Sixth Circuit had previously upheld the constitutionality of a nearly
identical phrase that was part of a university commencement prayer. Like the Ohio
motto, the commencement prayer in Chaudhuri v. State ofTennessee, 161 included the
statement, "we're so grateful, 0 Heavenly Father, that you've allowed us to come to
this occasion, so that we might be able to understand in God all things are
possible."16 2 The Sixth Circuit found that this graduation prayer, "lacking any explicit
or implicit reference to Jesus Christ," was not "overtly Christian."' 163 Instead, the
prayer was "no more than a 'tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among
the people of this country.' ",164 If that prayer was constitutional, and the national
motto is constitutional, then it is difficult to see how the Ohio motto could be
unconstitutional in the eyes of an observer who is aware of these American traditions.
Nevertheless, the original panel majority found otherwise, using a reasonable
observer who had no such knowledge of these American traditions, while possessing
an extraordinarily rare understanding of Christian texts and doctrine.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the constitutionality of ceremonial deism;
through the endorsement test, the Supreme Court has also found that government
actions that a reasonable observer would view as endorsing one faith over others are
unconstitutional. To reconcile these results, the endorsement test must be applied in a
manner consistent with the constitutionality of ceremonial deism. The endorsement
160 Unlike the Ohio motto case in the Sixth Circuit, the Pledge of Allegiance case in the Ninth
Circuit will not be reviewed en banc. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 321 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2003)
(denying rehearing and rehearing en banc).
However, the Ninth Circuit has ordered a 90-day stay, permitting students in the circuit to
continue to say the pledge in their schools. Henry Weinstein, Ban on Reference to God Delayed;
Stay Gives the High Court Time to Decide Whether to Review the Pledge ofAllegiance Case, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2003, pt. 2, at 1, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File-Major Newspapers;
Edward E. Plowman, Allegiance to the Constitution, WORLD MAG., Mar. 15,2003, LEXIS, News
Library, News Group File-Magazine Stories, Combined.
161 103 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 1997).
162 Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
163 Id. at 236.
164 Id. at 237 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)).
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test hinges on whether the reasonable observer would perceive a government
reference to religion as an impermissible endorsement of one religion over others.
This perception, in turn, depends upon the knowledge attributed to the reasonable
observer. Consequently, the "reasonable observer" must be presumed, at the very
least, to appreciate the American tradition of ceremonial deism and civic piety. If the
reasonable observer perceives government references to God as endorsements of
religion rather than as forms of ceremonial deism, then the national motto, the images
on our currency and monuments, and other cherished traditions will be struck down
as unconstitutional. Among those traditions will be the very documents that created
this country, including the Declaration of Independence and various forms of
ceremonial deism that were established and encouraged by the Framers of the
Constitution themselves.
Instead, courts must attribute to the reasonable observer the same basic
knowledge of ceremonial deism of which most grade school children are aware, such
as the traditional acceptance of the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance
and government mottos that refer to a "God." This observer would be better able to
reconcile the endorsement test's goal of preventing government endorsement of
religion with the protection of ceremonial deism traditions like those discussed in
Marsh. In this way, the two tests would work in tandem, rather than being viewed as
mutually exclusive and often contradictory analyses.
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